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Abstract: This article is a rebuttal to Robert G. Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti’s article, 
“Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis: Problems with Craig’s Inference to the Best Explanation,” 
which argues that the Standard Model of current particle physics entails that non-physical things (like 
a supernatural God or a supernaturally resurrected body) can have no causal contact with the physical 
universe. As such, they argue that William Lane Craig’s resurrection hypothesis is not only 
incompatible with the notion of Jesus physically appearing to the disciples, but the resurrection 
hypothesis is significantly limited in both its explanatory scope and explanatory power. This article 
seeks to demonstrate why their use of the Standard Model does not logically entail a rejection of the 
physical resurrection of Jesus when considering the scope and limitations of science itself. 
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RECENTLY, ROBERT G. CAVIN and Carlos A. Colombetti have criticized the 
case that William Lane Craig has made in favor of the resurrection of Jesus.1 
Craig argues that the claim “God supernaturally raised Jesus from the dead” 
(which we can call R) is more probable than any other competing hypothesis 
given the evidence of the empty tomb, the appearances of the risen Jesus, and 
the origin of the Christian church (we will call this evidence E).2 In presenting 
his “inference to the best explanation” argument, Craig makes use of seven 
criteria developed by philosopher of history, C. Behan McCullagh, for 
determining which hypothesis of several is the best. They include the ability to 
imply further statements about observable data, explanatory scope, 
                                               
 1 Robert Greg Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti, “Assessing the Resurrection 
Hypothesis: Problems with Craig’s Inference to the Best Explanation,” European Journal for 
Philosophy of Religion 11, no. 2 (Summer 2019): 205‒28, dx.doi.org/10.24204/ejpr.v11i2.2836. 
 2 Craig has written about the resurrection of Jesus on several occasions; Cavin and 
Colombetti concentrate on just two of his texts, viz., William Lane Craig, Assessing the New 
Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus, Studies in the Bible and Early 
Christianity 16 (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1989) and Reasonable Faith: Christian Truth 
and Apologetics, 3rd ed. (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2008). 
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explanatory power, plausibility, whether the hypothesis is ad hoc, whether the 
hypothesis is disconfirmed by fewer accepted beliefs, and whether the 
hypothesis exceeds its rivals in fulfilling the first six criteria. 
 Cavin and Colombetti raise several objections to the case that Crag 
makes. Some of them are, if not relatively trivial, at least insufficient to 
overthrow Craig’s overall thesis. For example, I think the two critics are right 
about prior probability being crucial in determining plausibility, but that does 
little to damage Craig’s overall case. I will comment on just a few of what I 
take to be their more important objections.  
 First, they argue that simply showing that the competing naturalistic 
explanations of E (e.g. conspiracy, wrong tomb, hallucination, legend, etc.) are 
probabilistically inferior to R does not by itself show that R is probable. R may 
still be highly improbable. What Craig needs, they say, is an additional 
hypothesis to the effect that “the set of rival hypotheses being considered is 
jointly exhaustive of all possible alternatives.”3 
 This is largely true, but it amounts to a feeble objection to Craig’s 
argument.4 Nonbelievers in R have been raising objections to R for almost two 
thousand years; suppose that Craig (or anybody) has shown that all the 
available naturalistic hypotheses are less probable than R. Then believers in R 
would be within their intellectual rights in saying, “Unless and until somebody 
comes up with a new competing explanation of the evidence (one that we have 
not already disposed of), the most probable explanation of the evidence is R.” 
That is, believers in R are within a believer’s rights in holding that the 
available alternative explanations of the evidence are indeed jointly exhaustive 
of all at least minimally plausible alternatives. 
 I say “minimally plausible” because in fact we can think of alternative 
explanations that have not yet been disposed of. For instance, someone could 
argue that just after Jesus was buried, astronauts from the planet 
Tralfalmidore secretly stole and disposed of the body; one of their number, 
cleverly disguised as Jesus, convinced certain people that he was Christ risen 
from the dead; and the story spread from there. But of course, that hypothesis 
is not minimally plausible and can safely be ignored. 
 I would argue that if Craig has shown that the alternative explanations 
that are out there in the literature are all improbable, that is an 
epistemologically significant achievement. At one point, Cavin and Colombetti 
hint that Craig does not argue against the “legend” hypothesis. But he does, in 
                                               
 3 Cavin and Colombetti, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis,” 208. 
 4 In my opinion, the statement is true except for the phrase, “all possible alternatives,” 
which is far too large a claim. See the nest paragraph.  







fact, argue against it. He argues that the earliest Christians started preaching 
the resurrection almost immediately; accordingly, there was insufficient time 
for a legend to develop.5 Moreover, the idea that the resurrection of Jesus is a 
legend is in fact part of, or a sub-set of, alternative hypotheses that he 
considers in some detail (i.e. it is not a separate hypothesis). In any case, the 
claim that Craig does not argue against the legend hypothesis is false.  
 Second, Cavin and Colombetti criticize Craig for not ranking the 
seven criteria that he employs. That is, he never says which of his criteria are 
more weighty or important than others.6 Is plausibility the most important 
criterion (as Michael Licona, another defender of R, says), or something else?  
Cavin and Colombetti go on to state, “Thus it remains unclear how to deal 
with inevitable cases in which rival theories satisfy different subsets of the 
criteria to varying degrees—e.g., high plausibility and low power versus low 
plausibility and high power.”7  This seems to be a fair point, but it amounts to 
a serious problem for Craig’s argument only if this sort of variation happens in 
evaluating R, which has yet to be shown. My own opinion is that Craig should 
endorse Licona’s view that plausibility is the most important criterion. Despite 
the fact that implausible reports are sometimes true (e.g. Russell’s paradox), we 
should reject implausible theories even if they satisfy other criteria. 
 Third, Cavin and Colombetti criticize Craig’s arguments that R is 
superior to the alternative explanations of E in terms of each of Craig’s seven 
criteria. I will deal only with one of the points that they make in this context, 
but I should note here that Cavin and Colombetti opt for using Bayes’ 
Theorem in the current debate, which Craig does not. I have no problem with 
this approach; using Bayesian methods and prior probability in investigating R 
is perfectly acceptable. On the other hand, while the formalism of Bayesian 
methods can certainly improve clarity, I think they add nothing substantive 
over non-Bayesian methods in this debate. 
 The point that I want to discuss is Cavin and Colombetti’s critique of 
Craig’s argument about the explanatory scope of R versus the naturalistic 
explanations of E. The superior scope of a hypothesis is its ability to imply a 
greater variety of observable data than its rival hypotheses. They argue: 1) that 
Craig mainly criticizes the scope of the alternative explanations and says little 
about the scope of R itself, which is an accurate observation; and 2) that R 
                                               
 5 I will not try to evaluate here whether Craig’s arguments against the legend 
hypothesis are convincing.  
 6 This is not quite true. Craig cites McCullagh to the effect that explanatory scope and 
power are the most important criteria. 
 7 Cavin and Colombetti, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis,” 212. 
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explains none of the points in E. In fact, they argue that R is inconsistent with E. 
And here I confess that I am maximally puzzled. 
 It is true that Craig does not say much in support of the scope of R; he 
just asserts that R can explain all three parts of E (the empty tomb, the 
appearances, and the origin of Christianity) while each of the natural 
alternatives to R explain, at most, one or two of them. I agree with Craig on 
that point. It is also true that in their details, the stories of the empty tomb and 
the appearances of the risen Jesus in the New Testament go far beyond the 
simple claim that we are calling R. But why might that constitute a problem? 
 Cavin and Colombetti correctly note that Craig will reply by 
appealing to certain auxiliary hypotheses regarding post-resurrection activities 
of Jesus, hypotheses that correspond in content to the New Testament 
accounts of the discovery of the empty tomb and the experiences of the risen 
Jesus. But then Cavin and Colombetti argue that R is “incompatible with these 
supplementary hypotheses.” They continue, “The scope of R is, thus, 
necessarily limited to the discovery of the empty tomb (or cross or grave) and 
thus must exclude, ironically, the experiences of the risen Jesus had by the 
witnesses.”8 This is, of course, so far a complete non sequitur, except that Cavin 
and Colombetti go on to explain what they mean in terms of the next point 
that I will consider, a point about physicality and the resurrection. 
 Fourth, Cavin and Colombetti point out that Craig’s account of the 
resurrection, following the relevant New Testament texts, depicts the 
resurrected body of Jesus as both physical and non-physical. It is physical in 
the sense of being capable of being seen, heard, touched, physically located, 
etc. It is non-physical in the sense of being a “supernatural body,” existing in 
its own non-physical universe where it can pass through walls, as well as 
materialize and dematerialize out of the physical universe. This, they flatly say, 
is impossible. But we then wonder: Why so? 
 Cavin and Colombetti next introduce the Standard Model of current 
particle physics (which, like them, we can call SM). They are thinking of 
quantum field theory and general relativity in which physical reality consists of 
quarks, electrons, and other particles gravitationally and electromagnetically 
interacting with each other. This theory, they correctly say, is very strongly 
confirmed; they even cite theoretical physicist Sean Carroll as insisting that 
SM will never be rejected. Naturally, I have no quarrel with SM; so far as I 
know, Carroll may even be correct about its irreplaceability. Of course, given 
the history of science and the limited longevity of most scientific theories, 
                                               
 8 Cavin and Colombetti, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis,” 216. 







Carroll’s claim seems a bit of a stretch. This is especially true since SM has 
serious limitations, which Cavin and Colombetti acknowledge. But I have no 
business arguing against SM and no desire to do so.  
 The reason that Cavin and Colombetti say Craig’s notion of the 
resurrection of Jesus is impossible is because SM entails that non-physical 
things “can have absolutely no contact with” the physical universe as 
described by SM.9 That is, only those things that are physical can interact 
causally with things that are physical. As they graphically and baldly put this 
point, “SM entails ~R and thereby disconfirms R to the maximal degree.”10 
 And I here have to wonder where Cavin and Colombetti learned that 
non-physical things can have absolutely no contact with physical things. They 
point out that Craig will protest that the resurrection of Jesus was a 
supernatural event brought about by God and that, accordingly, SM is 
irrelevant to the event. But, they say, this is confused because according to SM 
only those things that are physical can interact with things that are physical. The two 
critics point out that “one finds no mention of supernatural intervention in 
connection with the equations of SM (and of physics more generally) in the 
reference works, research journals, and textbooks of physics.”11 
 It sounds as if they believe that science ultimately decides whether or 
not there is a non-physical realm, or (if there is such a realm) whether it can 
causally interact with our ordinary physical one. Science apparently decides 
whether or not an intervening God exists. And I would just ask Cavin and 
Colombetti to explain what scientist in what lab or in what academic paper 
has ever proved that there are no miracles (in the sense of God [a non-physical 
being] bringing about events in the natural world that apart from divine action 
would not have occurred). Where does that interesting bit of information 
appear in the equations of SM? 
 Science studies natural events; it confines itself to the physical realm as 
described by SM. Who could quarrel with that? But how does it follow from 
that point that there is no realm not understood in terms of SM, or that that 
realm (if it exists) cannot causally interact with ordinary physical events? We 
are still looking at a total non sequitur.12   
                                               
 9 Cavin and Colombetti, “Assessing the Resurrection Hypothesis,” 218. 
 10 Ibid., 225‒26. 
 11 Ibid., 222. 
 12 Actually, Cavin and Colombetti could have used any physical theory (e.g. 
Newtonian mechanics) to make their point. The only difference is that there are probably no 
physicists who will argue (as Sean Carrol does for SM) that Newtonian mechanics will never be 
rejected. Or our two critics could have focused just on thermodynamics. There have been 
people who have argued that thermodynamics rules out any divine intervention in the physical 
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 Consider these arguments: Science only describes physical events; 
ergo, no non-physical events occur. Or perhaps: science only describes causal 
interactions among physical events; ergo, there can be no causal interactions 
between physical events and non-physical events. Does that line of reasoning 
make sense? I agree, by the way, with Cavin and Colombetti when they deny 
that SM is “naturalistic metaphysics.” I agree because SM does not entail “only 
those things that are physical can interact with things that are physical.” That 
thesis would be naturalistic metaphysics, yet it is supplied not by SM but only by 
our two critics. 
 Do Cavin and Colombetti not realize that there are lots of scientists—
and even particle physicists—who are believing Christians? Such folk affirm 
SM, but believe that God created the universe together with its natural laws 
and regularities. They believe that God has the ability and occasionally the 
intention to bring about events in the natural world that would not occur 
otherwise—events like bringing a dead man back to life in a body that has 
both natural and supernatural properties. Perhaps some of them would 
appeal—as some non-scientist apologists do—to the indeterminacy of 
quantum mechanics to allow a crack through which God could act causally 
undetected in the physical world. Of course, quantum mechanics is obviously 
not incompatible with SM. 
 Do our two critics really believe that science has proven that the 
resurrection of Jesus, as described in the New Testament and as defended by 
William Lane Craig, did not occur? If so, that belief is, well, rather 
breathtaking. I conclude that Craig’s defense of the resurrection of Jesus, as 
well as the resurrection of Jesus itself, still stands. Cavin and Colombetti have 
done little to overturn them.13 
                                                                                                                
world because then there would be new inputs of energy into the system; but that argument 
would fare no better than the SM argument. 
 13 For the rejoinder to this article, see Robert Greg Cavin and Carlos A. Colombetti, 
“The Implausibility and Low Explanatory Power of the Resurrection Hypothesis—With a 
Rejoinder to Stephen T. Davis,” Socio-Historical Examination of Religion and Ministry 2, no. 1 
(Spring 2020): 37‒94, https://doi.org/10.33929/sherm.2020.vol2.no1.04. 
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